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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review is from a final order of the Labor 
Commission of Utah dated July 29, 2010. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 
63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether Mr. Jex's motor vehicle accident, "arose out of and 
in the course of his employment" under section 34A-2-401, Utah Code, 
entitling him to receive worker's compensation benefits. 
Standard of Review 
The Court of Appeals should review the empirical facts for clear 
error. The Court of Appeals will disturb the Labor Commission's findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals must 
review the legal determinations of the Labor Commission under a 
correction-of-error standard, giving the Commission no deference as 
appellate courts have, "the power and duty to say what the law is and to 
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Labor Comm'n. 2007 UT 4, PI3 (Utah 2007) (quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The issue before the Court is a 
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mixed question of law and fact, one that calls upon the Court to review 
the application of law to fact.l 
1
 Respondents challenge the standard of review articulated by 
Petitioner. He cites a correction of error standard of review. The correct 
standard of review is articulated above. 
2 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah 
"Workers Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers' 
compensation benefits for industrial accidents. This section reads as 
follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who 
is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment, wherever 
such injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury . . . such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services . . . [and] medicines . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2011). 
Utah Courts have repeatedly held that an employee's injury does 
not "arise out of and occur "in the course of employment if the going 
and coming rule is found to apply. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question of whether a worker is entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits when that worker is car-pooling with 
another co-worker and is injured in his personal vehicle while traveling 
home from work from a construction site when, although having personal 
tools in his vehicle which he used on occasion at his own leisure at the 
work site, is not under the control or direction of the employer at the 
time of accident; chooses his own route and manner of travel; is not 
being compensated wages or travel expenses while traveling; is not on 
any company errand; is not performing any job duty for any benefit of 
the employer while traveling and, is not performing any work duties at 
the time of the accident. 
Course of the Proceedings 
1. On August 20, 2008, Mr. Jex filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking worker's compensation benefits from Respondents arising 
from a motor vehicle accident on July 22, 2008, while traveling on 
1-15 on his way home from work. (R., 1). 
2. On October 6, 2008, Respondents filed an Answer denying worker's 
compensation liability on the grounds that Mr. Jex's accident did 
4 
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not, "arise out of and in the course of employment" with 
Respondents. (R., 13-18). 
A hearing was held on February 26, 2009, before administrative 
law judge Cheryl Luke. At the hearing, the parties presented 
evidence including the testimony of Layne Jex and Trent Holden, 
the latter who testified for Respondents. (R., 74). 
On May 28, 2009, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. In that Order, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jex's 
accident did not, "arise out of and in the course of employment" 
with Respondents based upon the application of the going and 
coming rule. (R., 31-38). 
On June 26, 2009, Mr. Jex filed a Motion for Review challenging 
the ALJ's Order. (R., 39-50). 
On July 16, 2009, Respondents filed a Response to Motion for 
Review. (R., 52-68). 
On July 29, 2010, the Labor Commission issued its Order Affirming 
ALJ's Decision. {R., 70-72). 
On August 28, 2010, Mr. Jex filed a Petition for Review. Petitioner 
later filed a Docketing Statement on September 14, 2010. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. On June 2, 2008, Mr. Jex began working for Respondent, Precision 
Excavating. He worked as a machine operator. (R., 74 at 17, 49). 
2. On August 20, 2008, Mr. Jex filed an Application for Hearing and 
claimed an entitlement to workers' compensation benefits arising 
from a motor vehicle accident, which occurred while Mr. Jex was 
operating his own vehicle while traveling home with a co-worker 
from a construction site on July 22, 2008. (R., 1-9). 
3. On February 26, 2009, a hearing was conducted on Mr. Jex's 
claims. Mr. Jex's supervisor, Trent Holden, testified at the hearing 
that Respondent Precision Excavating is a St. George based 
company. He testified that there was a decrease in construction 
work available in the St. George area and that the company was 
going to lay off employees. He noted that the company was able to 
find work in the Cedar City, Utah area in lieu of laying off workers. 
Mr. Holden further testified that he told employees that there was a 
company truck available on a first come basis to transport them to 
the work site. He indicated that those who chose to operate their 
own vehicles would not be compensated for travel time or gas to 
and from the Cedar City job site. (R., 74 at 106). 
6 
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4. Mr. Jex testified that he occasionally drove his own truck to the job 
site and that sometimes he gave rides to co-workers. Mr. Jex 
admitted that he preferred to drive his own vehicle since some 
individuals smoked when riding to or from work in the company 
vehicle. He also confirmed that he was not paid for travel time or 
mileage when traveling to or from the job site from St. George. Mr. 
Jex also confirmed that he was not paid a gas stipend for his travel 
to or from the job site, or when he made a total of two errands on 
company time. (R., 74 at 50-54, 58-59, 63). 
5. On the date of the accident, Mr. Jex's work shift had ended. Mr. 
Jex then left the construction job site located in Cedar City and 
was traveling in his own truck on I-15 on his way home when he 
was involved in a motor vehicle accident. (R., 74 at 59). 
6. Trent Holden testified at hearing that at the end of the day on July 
22, 2008, he gave Mr. Jex instructions for the next day and told 
Mr. Jex that he could leave. Mr. Holden indicated that he was 
working late. Mr. Jex then drove down the hill away from the 
immediate work area and noticed that a Mustang driven by a fellow 
co-worker, J ames Irvin, was not on the work site. Mr. Jex assumed 
that Mr. Irvin may need a ride home since Mr. Holden was working 
7 
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late. Mr. Jex drove back to discuss the matter with Mr. Holden and 
inquired if he should give Mr. Irvin a ride home. Mr. Holden said: 
"Yeah go ask James , if he wants to go now and give him a ride." 
Mr. Holden testified that Mr. Irvin could have remained on the job 
site and work overtime and ride home in the company truck. 
However, from the testimony presented, it was not made clear by 
Mr. Jex to Mr. Irvin that he had the option to stay on the job site 
and to continue working, if he chose to do so. (R., 74 at 94-96). 
7. Mr. Holden testified that he had never required Mr. Jex to give Mr. 
Irvin a ride home. He simply agreed, at Mr. J ex's suggestion, that 
if Petitioner and Mr. Irwin wanted to ride home together, they were 
f r ee todoso . (R., 74 at 94-96). 
8. Evidence was presented at hearing showing that Mr. Irvin left the 
job site with Mr. Jex in Mr. Jex's personal vehicle. They made no 
stops on the way home and, after 40 minutes into the drive, a tire 
came apart on Mr. Jex's vehicle, and the vehicle rolled. (R., 74 at 
29-30). 
9. At the hearing, Mr. Jex brought an exhibit of tools which he carried 
in his personal truck. He claimed to have occasionally used some of 
these tools in his work at the Cedar City job site. These tools 
8 
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included a tape measure, pipe wrench, crescent wrench, sledge 
hammer, and a level. (R., 74 at 32-34). 
10. On cross examination, Petitioner admitted that it was at his own 
convenience to have the tools available for his use at the Cedar City 
job site. He acknowledged that his ownership of these tools was not 
a required condition of his employment with Respondent, Precision 
Excavating. In fact, Mr. Jex admitted that Respondent, Precision 
Excavating, had similar tools available for him to use at the job 
site, and that the employer did not require him to bring any tools 
for use at the job site. Petitioner also admitted that the tools were 
used by him for his own personal use, and were not purchased or 
maintained by the employer. (R., 74 at 66-79). 
11. Mr. Holden similarly testified that all of the tools needed for the 
Cedar City project were provided for by the employer, and Mr. Jex 
was not required to bring his own tools to the job site. (R., 74 at 
97-105). 
12. Mr. Jex also presented testimony that on two occasions, he used 
his personal truck to run errands for his employer on the Cedar 
City job. Once, Mr. Jex traveled to Napa Auto Parts and later to 
Wheeler Machinery to get parts needed for the project. He 
9 
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admitted that he was not paid for gas consumption at the time he 
ran these two errands, but that he was on the payroll clock. 
However, neither of these errands occurred on the date of the 
accident. (R., 74 at 44-46). 
13. Evidence was also presented by both Mr. Jex and Mr. Holden that 
the employer did not instruct Mr. Jex how to drive or to maintain 
his personal vehicle; which route to travel to and from the job site; 
that Mr. Jex was not under any employer control or supervision at 
the time of the accident; and that Mr. Jex was on a public freeway 
when the accident occurred. (R., 74 at 57-58). 
14. On May 28, 2009 ALJ Cheryl Luke issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. In that Order, the ALJ determined 
that Mr. Jex's accident did not "arise out of and in the course of 
employment" with Respondent based upon the application of the 
going and coming rule. (R., 31-38). The ALJ opined that Jex's 
accident fell within the traditional going and coming rule situation. 
15. On June 26, 2009, Mr. Jex filed a Motion for Review challenging 
the ALJ's Order. (R., 39-50). Mr. Jex argued that an exception to 
the going and coming rule applied since he was using his personal 
10 
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vehicle as an "instrumentality" of the employer's business on the 
date of injury and did so regularly. (R., 39-50). 
On July 16, 2009, Respondents filed a Response to Motion for 
Review. {R., 52-68). Respondents argued that the ALJ properly 
determined that Mr. Jex's accident fell within the traditional going 
and coming rule and was, therefore, not compensable under the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Respondents argued that Mr. 
Jex's vehicle was not an instrumentality of Precision's business and 
in fact, Mr. Jex was not performing any job related service while 
traveling home from work; was not on any company errand or 
special mission at the time of accident; was not being compensated 
for his travel time between the work site and home; the risk 
associated with travel was one common to the general public; and 
Mr. Jex was not under the control or supervisor of the employer at 
the time of the accident. (R., 52-68). 
On July 29, 2010, the Commission issued its Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. (R., 70-71). The Commission agreed with Respondent 
that Mr. Jex's accident did not arise out of and in the course of 
employment. The Commission determined that Mr. Jex's accident 
was subject to the going and coming rule and was not 
11 
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compensable. The Commission rejected Mr. Jex's arguments that 
any of the exceptions to the going and coming rule applied in this 
case. 
18. On August 28, 2010, Mr. Jex filed a Petition for Review. Mr. Jex 
later filed a Docketing Statement on September 14, 2010. 
12 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission's Order should be affirmed. The going and coming 
rule squarely applies to the facts of this case. Contrary to Mr. Jex's 
assertion, no exception to this rule applies. 
The employer did not require Mr. Jex to perform any job-related 
service or use his personal vehicle as a business instrumentality while 
traveling to or from work. Mr. Jex was not on a company related "special 
errand" or "special mission" at the time of the accident.2 Mr. Jex was not 
compensated for his time spent traveling between his home and the job 
site, and he was not paid a gas stipend. The employer did not regulate 
how Mr. Jex maintained or drove his own vehicle. The accident did not 
occur on the employer's premises, nor did Mr. Jex's duties require him to 
be at the place where the accident occurred. The risk that caused the 
accident was one common to the traveling public (a defective tire on Jex's 
personal vehicle which Mr. Jex personally maintained) and was not 
created by any duties connected with Mr. Jex's employment. Mr. Jex 
was not under the control or supervision of his employer at the time of 
the accident. He had chosen his own route each day, and had done so at 
2
 The transportation of a co-employee home was not mandated by the 
employer as a job duty. Moreover, Mr. Jex was not compensated for this 
travel. Hence, this activity does not qualify as a special errand or mission. 
13 
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the time of the accident. It was not a benefit to the employer for Mr. Jex 
to ride home from the job site with a co-worker. Respondent, Precision 
Excavating did not require Mr. Jex to take home a fellow co-worker on 
the date of the accident, nor did the employer mandate that Mr. Jex use 
his own vehicle for transportation to and from the job site. Mr. Jex could 
have car-pooled with other co-workers, but he voluntarily chose not to do 
so. 
The Commission was also correct to note that finding of 
compensability under the present facts of this case makes little sense 
and would essentially eviscerate the going and coming rule. Simply 
because a worker may carry with him a tool that could be used for work 
(i.e., a favorite business pen or other article), or in this case a few 
miscellaneous tools similarly used by many individuals in non-
employment settings, or that the injured worker elects to ride to or from 
work with a fellow co-worker, does not unilaterally overcome the general 
going and coming rule. 
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Jex's argument, it is Mr. Jex's burden to 
show, by a preponderance of evidence, that his case falls within the 
exception of the going and coming rule. It is not Respondent's burden to 
prove otherwise. Since Mr. Jex has failed to do so, and has failed to 
14 
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show any reversible error, this Court should affirm the Commission's 
Order, deny Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation benefits, and 
dismiss his Application for Hearing with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY RULED THAT COMPENSABILITY FOR 
THIS ACCIDENT IS BARRED BY THE GOING AND COMING RULE 
Mr. Jex challenges the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. He argues that the Commission, like the ALJ, improperly 
denied his claims for worker compensation benefits since his accident is 
subject to exception from the going- and- coming rule. He argues that 
his personal vehicle was an instrumentality of the employer's business 
and, therefore, is an exception to the going and coming rule. 
Respondents disagree that any exception to the going and coming rule 
applies and submit that both the ALJ and the Commission properly 
evaluated this case and denied workers' compensation benefits to Mr. 
Jex under the well-established going-and- coming rule. 
In Utah, to be eligible for workers1 compensation benefits, an 
employee's injury must, "arise out of and be sustained "in the course of 
employment". Utah Code Ann, § 34A-2-401. As a general rule in Utah, 
an employee's injury does not arise out of and occur in the course of 
employment if the injury is sustained while going to or coming from work 
15 
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since these injuries are outside the time, space, and activity boundaries 
of work. See Drake v. Industrial Common of Utah. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 
1997); VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct App. 
1995). The coming-and-going rule arose because, "'in most instances, 
such an injury is suffered as a consequence of the risks and hazards to 
which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks 
and hazards having to do with and originating in the wrork or business of 
the employer.'" Drake, 939 P.2d at 182 (quoting 82 Am. Jur . 2d Workers' 
Compensation § 296 (1992)). 
In support of the "going and coming" rule, the Utah Supreme Court 
has reasoned that: 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is 
unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for 
conduct of its employees over which it has no control and 
from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a 
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his 
control over the conduct. 
Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Professor Larson indicates that this general rule typically applies to 
employees having fixed hours of employment and place of work, known 
as "inside employees". "Outside employees" are characterized as 
employees that do not have a definite time and space boundary on their 
16 
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employment. See Professor Larson treatise on worker's compensation at 
13.01. Utah's courts have explained that easier cases involve inside 
employees. However, in more difficult cases, when the journey is 
relatively regular, whether every day, or at frequent intervals, the case 
begins with a strong presumption that an employee's going-and-
coming trip is expected to be no different than any other employee 
with reasonably regular hours and place of work. See Drake, 939 P.2d 
at 183. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the ALJ found that the motor vehicle accident in which 
Mr. Jex was involved, did not arise out of and in the course of Mr. Jex's 
employment due to the application of the going and coming rule. The ALJ 
explains her rationale in detail as follows: 
In this case the petitioner argues that the 
transportation of co-workers both to and from the job site, the 
carrying and use of personal tools at the job site and the two 
time use of his vehicle to run a company errand are sufficient 
to sustain a finding of compensability. 
Careful analysis of the facts in this case even when 
liberally construed in favor of the petitioner demonstrates 
otherwise. It was clear when the job was offered that it was 
the employee's responsibility to get to and from work (the 
traditional going and coming). When there was not work in St. 
George the employees were given an option of working at the 
Cedar City job site. The company would offer to shuttle over 
workers in the one truck that was assigned to the job site 
supervisor. The shuttle was offered on a first come basis and 
employees were not going to be paid for travel time or 
17 
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\ 
expenses. In VanLeeuwen v Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 
281,284 (Utah App. 1995) we find that the general rule of 
non-compensability has an exception in situations where the 
employer provides transportation primarily for the employer's 
own benefit and exercises control over the use of that 
transportation. Under Utah law the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a 
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his 
control over the conduct of the employee. In this case Mr. Jex 
made a choice to drive his own vehicle for his own reasons 
including not being around smokers. The employer did not 
exercise any control over what days Mr. Jex drove, what 
vehicle he used, what routes he took to and from work. The 
loose cooperation between Mr. Jex in offering rides to other 
co-workers was not mandated by the employer. On the date 
of the accident Mr. Jex offered the ride to his co-worker and 
his communication with Mr. Holden is best described as 
informational communication, not employer instructions. In 
some cases getting a crew or other workers to the job might 
be of benefit to the employer. The trip in question only 
benefitted Mr. James and Mr. Jex who wanted to travel home 
from work like any other employee. There is no indication 
that had Mr. Jex not offered a ride to Mr. James that Mr. 
Holden and Precision Excavation's work would have been in 
anyway hindered as Mr. Holden was ready and able to give 
Mr. James a ride home. Indeed Mr. Holden testified that he 
told Mr. Jex to see if Mr. James wanted to leave or continue 
working. Mr. Jex botched the message and didn't 
communicate it in a way that gave Mr. James the option of 
working late which may have benefitted the employer. 
Can Mr. Jex make his car an instrumentality of employment 
unilaterally? Clearly Mr. Jex used some of his own tools at 
the job and carried them in his truck. The convincing 
evidence is that this was not a job requirement, and was not 
necessary (he worked without problem on the days he rode 
with Mr. Holden and did not have access to the tools). The 
going and coming rule would be eviscerated if an employee 
could choose to bring something to work) a favorite pen for 
example (and unilaterally overcome the rule. 
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The third exception that is suggested by petitioner is that he 
was running a special errand for the company. They point to 
the trips to NAPA auto parts and Wheeler Machinery and then 
try to argue that giving James a ride home is similar. The 
NAPA and Wheeler errands were on company time during the 
work day and certainly if this accident had occurred while 
coming and going to get parts on those errands we would not 
be debating compensability. The accident in fact occurred off 
the clock on the employee's way home. This is the traditional 
coming and going situation and compensability is not proven. 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is 
unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for 
conduct of its employees over which it has no control and 
from which it derives no benefit Cross v Brd. of Review Indus. 
Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202 (Ut. Ct App). 
In this case the petitioner has not proven that he was any 
different then any other employee driving to and from a work 
place and ride-sharing with co-workers as a mutual 
convenience. Mr. Jex carried some personal tools that he 
could and did use at the job site but he was not required to 
do so and the company provided all necessary tools at the job 
site. Lastly Mr. Jex was on his way home and not under the 
control, direction or of benefit to his employer at the time of 
the accident. There has been no proof that supports a finding 
in the petitioner's favor under any exception to the going and 
coming rule. 
I find that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of 
proof that the accident and injuries suffered in the motor 
vehicle accident on July 22, 2008 arose out of and in the 
course of his employment. 
(R., 31-38). 
The Commission agreed with the ALJ and found that while Mr. 
Jex's truck twice served to benefit Respondent, Precision Excavating's 
business, in order to be exempt from the going and coming rule, Mr. Jex 
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must show that his truck served as an instrumentality to benefit 
Respondent, Precision Excavating's business at the time of the accident 
The Commission further explained, that at the time of the accident, Mr. 
Jex was ridesharing with a co-worker out of convenience, not because 
Respondent, Precision Excavating mandated he do so. The Commission 
further explained that the employer did not pay Mr. Jex for his travel 
costs or provide any transportation to him at the time of the accident. 
Accordingly, the Commission found no control by the employer or benefit 
to the employer sufficient to exempt Mr. Jex from the traditional going 
and coming rule standard. 
Respondents submit that the ALJ and Commission's findings and 
application of the law in this case should be affirmed by this Court. 
Av The ALJ and Commission Correctly Determined that Mr. 
Jex's Truck Was Not An Instrumentality of Business. 
Mr. Jex argues that an exception to the going and coming rule 
applies since he was using his personal vehicle as an, "instrumentality 
of business" for the employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident. 
He cites to a variety of cases in an attempt to support this position. 
Respondents disagree with Mr. Jex's argument and assert that the ALJ / 
Commission's finding that Mr. Jex's accident, occurring in his personal 
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vehicle on his way home from work, is barred by the going and coming 
rule.3 
Mr. Jex relies on VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Common, 901 P.2d 281 
(Utah C t App. 1995) to support his argument. However, VanLeewen, 
actually supports the denial of benefits in this case. In VanLeewen, the 
Court found that the claimant's motor vehicle accident on his way to 
work did not arise out of and in the course of employment despite 
driving a company-owed truck. The court held that the going and 
coming rule has some exceptions, such as where, "the employer requires 
the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business." 
The court stressed, however, that the circumstances did not bring Mr. 
VanLeewen's motor vehicle accident within the course of employment 
since: 1) the employer did not require him to perform any job-related 
service or use the company vehicle as a business instrumentality while 
traveling to or from work; 2) he was not on any company related "special 
errand" or "special mission" at the time of the accident; 3) he was not 
being compensated for his time spent traveling between his home and 
3
 In Barney v. Industrial Common, 506 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1973) the 
court stated the general rule that - ordinarily, an employee is not within the 
scope of employment when he furnishes his own transportation and is 
injured when going to or from his place of employment. Such is the case 
here. 
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the employer's office; 4) the accident did not occur on the employer's 
premises, nor did VanLeeuwen's duties require him to be at the place 
where the accident occurred; 5) the risk that caused the accident was 
one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties 
connected with his employment; and, 6) VanLeewen was not under the 
control or supervision of the employer at the time of the accident, had 
chosen his own route each day, and occasionally engaged in personal 
errands while traveling to and from work. 
Mr. Jex also cites Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 398 P.2d 
545 (Utah 1965). In Bailey, an employee was involved in a fatal car 
accident when driving his own vehicle to his work - a service station. 
However, in Bailey the court held that the personal vehicle was an 
instrumentality of business since it was used by the employee for 
emergency calls at all hours; the employee was required to carry 
necessary tools to service and repair customer's automobiles; the 
employee permitted customers to use this vehicle when their cars were 
being serviced; and the employee was reimbursed by the employer for all 
oil and gas charges for the vehicle. There the court held that it was the 
employee's regular and definite duty to take the vehicle to work at the 
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service station in the mornings for its use in that business. The Bailey 
case can be distinguished from the case at bar. 
Mr. Jex further cites to Moser v. Industrial Commission, 440 P.2d 
23 (Utah 1968). In Moser, the court held that a claimant's motor vehicle 
accident which occurred when pouring gasoline into his truck, was 
compensable. In Moser, the employer owed the truck but leased it back 
to the employee. The court held that the status of the truck in that 
instance was, "the same as if it had belonged to the company" since it 
was "committed to being used in defendant's business." Additionally the 
employee in the Moser case was under the direction of the employer to 
follow specific maintenance guidelines, including reporting of any service 
work needed. 
Mr. Jex also cites to State v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051 
(Utah 1984) to argue that an injury is compensable when transportation 
is furnished by the employer to benefit the employer. In State, the court 
evaluated whether a workers' motor vehicle accident was compensable 
when she was on her way to a job related training program from her 
usual place of employment. There, the court found the claim 
compensable under the "special errand" exception since Petitioner's 
employer benefitted from her training program, she embarked with the 
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knowledge and at the direction of the employer and such travel was 
directly related to her job function. See id. at 1054-55. 
The facts of the present case support the ALJ and the 
Commission's finding that Mr. Jex's accident does not fall within an 
exception to the going and coming rule based upon the use of Mr. Jex's 
vehicle as the instrumentality of the employer's business. Here, the 
vehicle driven by the Mr. Jex was his own. Although Mr. Jex used his 
vehicle on two occasions for business purposes4, the motor vehicle driven 
by Mr. Jex was not committed to being used in the employer's business, 
nor was the vehicle being used for any employer purpose at the time of 
the accident. Unlike the court in Moser, Mr. Jex had not been given 
any general maintenance guidelines for use or operation of the vehicle, 
and he was not required to report any service work needed on his car to 
his employer. Moreover, unlike the court in Bailey, Mr. Jex was not 
required to respond to any emergency service calls for his employer; he 
did not allow the employer or co-workers to use his vehicle for business 
4
 Mr. Jex presented testimony that on two occasions, he used his 
personal truck to run errands for his employer on the Cedar City job. Once, 
Mr. Jex traveled to Napa Auto Parts and later to Wheeler Machinery to get 
parts needed for the project. He admitted that he was not paid for gas 
consumption at the time he ran these errands, but that he was on the 
payroll clock. However, neither of these errands occurred on the date of the 
accident. (R., 74 at 44-46). 
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purposes; and Mr. Jex was not reimbursed by the employer for any oil 
and gas charges for the use of his own vehicle, either while on and 
errand or when traveling to and from work. 
In addition, Mr. Jex was not on any special errand for the employer 
nor was the employer benefitting from his travel or directing his travel. 
Moreover, such travel was not directly related to any job function -
rather, Mr. Jex was simply traveling home from work as he would on any 
other occasion at the end of his work shift. 
Mr. Jex also argues that because he had tools in his personal 
vehicle that he would, on occasion, use at the employer's job site, his 
accident falls within an exception of the going and coming rule. While 
Mr. Jex admittedly had tools in his vehicle at the time of the accident, 
the tools did not belong to the employer but rather, were his own 
personal tools which he used on occasion at work. Moreover, as testified 
by Trent Holden, and admitted by Mr. Jex, the employer did not require 
that Mr. Jex carry these tools with him to use on any company related 
project. In fact, the employer had all the necessary tools available at the 
job site for Mr. Jex's use.5 Finally, as correctly stated by the 
5
 Mr. Jex argues that the company tools were not readily available for 
his use and were as far as 2 miles away from his work assignment. 
Respondents disagree with Mr. Jex's distorted assertion that the tools were 
located at such a distance from the company truck which contained all the 
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I 
Commission, Mr. Jex was not using his tools at the time of the accident 
nor was he using his vehicle to serve any employment purpose or for the 
benefit of the employer at the time of the accident. He was simply 
traveling home from work. To adopt Mr. Jex's argument would mean 
that any time an employee carries a work related item in their vehicle 
(i.e, a favorite work pen as stated by the ALJ as an example), or a 
screwdriver, a wrench, or a tape measurer, and is injured in an accident 
traveling home from work, the accident falls within an exception of the 
going and coming rule. Certainly, this general rule would be eviscerated 
if Mr. Jex's suggested application of the going and coming rule were 
adopted. 
need tools for the job and which remained on the job site at all times. At 
most, Respondents contend that Mr. Jex may have had to walk a few 
hundred yards to the company truck for tools, on occasion. 
In addition, Mr. Jex argues that the employer expected him to use his 
truck and tools for business purposes. That is not the case. Mr. Holden did 
not testify that Mr. Jex's truck or tools were needed for any company 
purpose. While Mr. Jex did run a total of two errands in his truck to pick 
up parts, the employer did not mandate that Mr. Jex use his personal 
vehicle to run these two errands since a company truck was always 
available for Mr. Jex's use. Moreover, while the employer permitted Mr. 
Jex to use some of his personal tools on the job site, there was no 
requirement that he do so, nor was there any substantial benefit to the 
employer since the employer had the same tools available in the company 
truck for Mr. Jex to use. 
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B. The ALJ and Commission Correctly Held that this 
Accident Was Not Compensable Simply Because Mr. Jex 
Had a Co-employee Traveling with him at the time of the 
Accident. 
Mr. Jex also argues that because he was traveling with a co-
employee as a passenger, the accident, "arose out of and in the course 
of employment". Mr. Jex specifically argues that the employer required 
and expected him to help transport employees to and from the job site on 
this date and on a regular basis and was expected to be available with 
transportation in his personal vehicle. Respondents disagree with Mr. 
Jex's self-serving interpretation of the facts and his application of the law 
to the facts in this case. 
First, Mr. Jex incorrectly states that the employer mandated that 
he transport co-employees to and from the job site. Mr. Jex's supervisor, 
Trent Holden, testified that there was no obligation or employer mandate 
that Mr. Jex transport co-workers to and from the job site on a regular 
basis or on the date of this accident. Mr. Jex's decision to do so was 
entirely voluntary and was based upon his desire to have company in his 
commute home, and to ride in a smoke-free vehicle. 
Moreover, Mr. Jex does not cite to any authority to support his 
argument that the transportation of a co-employee unilaterally renders 
the going and coming rule inapplicable. In fact, the present case is akin 
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to that of Cross v. Bd. of Rev.. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) where 
the Court of Appeals held that a ride sharing arrangement between an 
employee and his foreman was out of mutual convenience rather than at 
the direction of the employer and, therefore, denied benefits. The Cross 
court additionally stated that transportation to a job site is not integral 
and necessary to employment as a construction worker. While the court 
stated that the one benefit conferred upon the employer by such travel is 
the employee's arrival at work, this benefit was insufficient to bring the 
accident outside of the general going and coming rule. In fact, the court 
directly stated that the construction business is not deserving of special 
treatment in going and coming cases. 
Other cases also provide support for the Commission's denial of 
benefits in this case. In Wilson v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 P.2d 1116 
(Utah 1949) an employee died while riding as a passenger with a co-
employee. In the Wilson case, the court held that the going and coming 
rule bars benefits. In that case, the court looked to a variety of factors 
supporting a denial of benefits to include as follows: The claimant was 
not performing work duties while traveling; the claimant was not at work 
at the time set when the injury occurred; the employer did not change 
his hour of departure form work; and the employer did not give the 
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claimant any instructions on the route of travel, or exercise any control 
over the employee. These factors apply with equal force to this case and 
support the ALJ's denial of Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation benefits should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
C. The Commission Did Not Rely on Any Incompetent 
Evidence. 
Mr, Jex also argues that the Commission relied upon incompetent 
hearsay evidence, amounting to a violation of Mr. Jex's right to due 
process. At the outset, Respondents note that this argument was only 
mentioned in passing in Petitioner's Motion for Review in a footnote. (R., 
47). Moreover, a timely objection was not made by Mr. Jex at the 
evidentiary hearing. Therefore, there is no error committed by the 
Commission in its failure to address this argument as Mr. Jex provided 
no substantive or timely argument on this issue at the administrative 
hearing. 
Aside from these procedural flaws, Mr. Jex specifically argues that 
the Labor Commission improperly relied on a hearsay statement of 
James Irvin, introduced through Trent Holden; that Mr. Irvin did not 
want to leave the worksite but wanted to work longer on the date of 
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( 
accident. (R., 74 at 96). At hearing, Trent Holden testified that when Mr. 
Jex went back and asked if he should give James Irving a ride home, Mr. 
Holden responded that he could ask James Irving if he wants to go and 
give him a ride or that he could stay and work later. Evidence was also 
presented through Mr. Holden that Mr. Irving was upset because Mr. Jex 
never communicated that he could stay and work late. (R., 74 at 95). 
Mr. Jex argues that this evidence was improperly relied upon by the 
Commission. 
Although these statements made by Mr. Holden are hearsay, Utah 
law permits the introduction of hearsay evidence in worker's 
compensation cases. Indeed, it is well settled that hearsay evidence is 
admissible in an administrative hearing before the Commission; however, 
the Commission's Findings of Fact cannot be based exclusively on 
hearsay evidence and there must be a residuum of evidence, legal and 
competent in a court of law, to support an award. See Hoskings v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In this case, there was other competent evidence to support the 
ALJ and Commission's ruling that the employer did not mandate ride 
sharing and was not controlling Mr. Jex's actions immediately prior to 
the accident. Indeed, other non-hearsay evidence, including that 
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evidence of Mr. Holden was presented at the hearing to show that the 
employer did not require Mr. Jex to transport any employees to and 
from work. (R., 74 at 95-97). On this basis, the ALJ and the 
Commission's order is not based solely upon unsubstantiated hearsay 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Commission's Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decision. Mr. Jex's accident falls within the general 
provisions of the going and coming rule. Mr. Jex has not shown that any 
exception to this rule applies or that the Commission made any legal 
error which warrants a reversal of the Labor Commission's decision. 
Q#L Respectfully submitted this \ day of March, 2011. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Bret? A. Gardner 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellees, Precision 
Excavating and Owners Insurance 
Company 
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